Introduction
This chapter will look at one of the most turbulent periods in the history of the Local Government and Fire Services in particular in England. It was a period that saw 'an unprecedented attempt by UK central government to transform the politics and performance of English local government' with the result being 'a decade of unprecedented change, which had profound implications for the governance of local communities and management of local services (Downe and Martin, 2007) . How this agenda played out in the Fire Services is one of the most interesting but surprisingly confusing stories of the period from 1997 to 2005. Modernisation during this period was generally regarded more positively in other public services, such as local government and the NHS, and much needed changes in the Fire Service were slower to materialise. As we will see from the next chapter, by the time New Labour left office in 2010, the Fire Service was much more positively engaged in a public service improvement agenda focussing on prevention, protection and collaborative working across public services. This chapter focusses on the complex and fascinating earlier period of 1997-2005. When Tony Blair's New Labour government took office after the landslide election of 1997, responsibility for the fire and rescue services in England, Scotland and Wales was part of the Home Office's portfolio. The service in Northern Ireland, which had been a single Fire and Recuse Service since the Belfast Fire Brigade and the Northern Ireland Fire Authority amalgamated in 1973, was the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Office. Northern Ireland was still under 'direct rule' from Westminster and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 had yet to be signed.
The relationship between the Home Office and the (then) Fire and Rescue Brigades could be characterised as one of 'benign neglect' 1 (Raynsford, 2016) . The Home Office agenda and its media coverage was dominated by criminal justice, immigration, the prisons and the security services, all of which enjoyed a higher priority with the government of the time. Successive Home Secretaries and the fire services themselves were content to accept a low (some would say almost subterranean) profile. This is also a reasonable characterisation of the relationships between local fire brigades and the vast majority of local fire authorities as well as the relationship between local fire services collectively with the Local Government Association and its predecessors. Fire and Rescue Services had been allowed to quietly ossify and they were ill prepared for the approaching 'modernisation' storm.
The legislative basis for the service in essence, remained the 1947 Fire Services Act, which transferred the functions of the short-lived, National Fire Service, created as part of the response to the Blitz during the Second World War, back to local authority control. The Fire Services Act 1959, dealt primarily with pensions and staffing, and there was then no additional primary legislation prior to the New Labour administration coming to power in 1997. Various changes to the structure of Local Government, including the comprehensive reorganisation of 1974, caused barely a ripple in the services as the governance and management of the service elided into the new local authorities.
This primary legislative inactivity was also reflected in a paucity of secondary legislation, policy guidance and performance data and information. The Audit Commission, following its creation in 1983, and prior to 1997, produced only two reports and a management handbook 2 , (Audit Commission 1986 , 1995a , 1995b of fire services, despite the services being part of the annual collection of local authority performance data since its inception in 1993/94 3 (Audit Commission 1995c).
In terms of the response to widespread emergencies, disasters and major incidents, it is sanguine to quote the Civil Contingencies Act. "Part 2 of the Act updates the 1920 Emergency Powers Act to reflect the developments in the intervening years and the current and future risk profile". The framework for cooperation and collaboration with the other emergency services was as neglected as the legislative and policy parameters for the service itself.
The themes for this chapter
This chapter will review the experience of the fire service under the first two New Labour (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) administrations. In order to focus the account, it will adopt three themes, although these themes clearly overlapped and were inter-related. The three themes are those included in the chapter title namely  modernisation,  local public service alignment, and  inter-agency partnership and collaboration.
Prior to 1997 the service had suffered, as noted above, from a lack of direction from central government.
Since 1976, it also suffered long-term under-investment from both central and local government and allowed outdated policies and practices, particularly in terms of its industrial relations, to generate an insular and defensive organisational culture. A series of reports into major disasters and emergencies also meant it was losing its reputation and the confidence of the public. It was about to change, albeit unwillingly. 
The gathering storm 1997-2002
In 1997, prior to the 1999 Greater London Authority Act, the formation of the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority and the devolution of services to Scotland, and later Wales, there were 50 fire and rescue services in England and Wales and 8 services in Scotland. They were all under local authority control (see table 1 Home Secretary was to re-assert the need for multiple and several organisational responsibility for longterm intractable social problems (which were coined the' wicked issues'). This Act, and what followed, would radically affect the future scope, form and responsibilities of the Fire Services.
Collaboration and alignment of local agencies
The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act is more famous for its introduction of sex-offender, anti-social and parental orders, but the conceptual thinking and theoretical underpinning that the Act also re-introduced were actually more significant fundamental changes in the approach to the policy and practice of local service delivery.
By 1997 policy makers and academics were much exercised by long term and seemingly intractable social, economic and environmental issues, the 'wicked issues'. These issues were not, apparently, amenable to single agency solution or even mitigation. They required multiple agencies to work together to adopt a focussed, determined and co-ordinated approach in order to have significant impact.
Crime and the rising levels of disorder in civil society were prime examples. The Act re-introduced two fundamental concepts: multiple and several responsibilities for addressing the problem at the local community level, and the need for joined up policy and delivery at local and national levels of government. Henceforth both the Chief Constable and the Chief Executive of the local authority were made personally responsible for producing and maintaining a crime and disorder audit, a reduction strategy and the establishment and leadership of a local partnership of key agencies. Central and Local government would co-produce policy and both would be mutually responsible for public service delivery.
The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, was the first example of both joined-up policy and delivery under New Labour, as well as multiple and several responsibility between agencies for tackling economic, social or environmental problems seemingly endemic in local communities.
Collaboration and partnership working were not new but the period between 1979 and 1996, had seen a reduction in the number of formal and informal partnerships that local agencies were statutorily obliged to be actively engaged with. Individual agency and personal responsibility, were acknowledged to be appropriate for tackling some issues, but the persistence of crime and disorder, the rise in teenage pregnancies, the stubborn resistance of attainment levels in schools to improve or the increasing inequality of health outcomes required a more collective approach. No longer was it a case of investing in prison or probation, health protection or hospitals, prevention rather than cure. It was now a question of joined up policy and practise, and investment in both sets of approaches. This led to the government's early mantra for local service
delivery of 'what matters is what works' (Labour Party 1997). Local
Authorities, the local NHS, the Police and Fire Services were the core of the Local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, established by the Act, and many more of the local public service delivery partnerships that were to follow.
Similarly, the 1980s and early 90s, had also seen a series of major incidents, emergencies and disasters that had clearly challenged the capacity and capabilities of the local emergency services, and required much more joined-up planning, reaction and response than the emergency services were able to provide. The At the same time as the seemingly endless series of inquests or inquiries reporting on these disasters was casting a critical spotlight onto the response from emergency services, the new government's demand for 'modernisation' of the public services was growing. Local Government and the NHS were in the vanguard of modernisation but criminal justice, the police and the fire service would not escape.
Modernisation in the Fire Service was not the same as modernisation in local government or the NHS.
However, the nature and form of Fire Service modernisation was, inevitably, heavily influenced by local authority modernisation, because Fire was a local authority service, and the other services then under local authority control were forging ahead with the governments' agenda.
The details, and the development of the fire sectors complex relationship to modernisation, can however only be understood by looking at the service with knowledge of three critical factors:
 The benign neglect of the fire agenda by the Home Office,  the publication of two very critical independent reports into the service, and  the co-incidental release of two government documents, which, to this day have generated a conspiracy or cock-up debate, that will probably only be resolved by the official release of confidential papers in years to come.
It may have been deliberate, or it may have been a co-incidence, but the day that the white paper on Local Government Modernisation was released, was also the day that the government sent a letter to the Fire Services national negotiators, notifying them that the employers were seeking a more flexible negotiating framework at national level (Burchill 2004 (Bain et al. 2002, pii) .
Local Government Modernisation
Between 1998 and 2004, the local government modernisation agenda was central to the reform and improvement of locally delivered public services in England and Wales (Andrews et al. 2003 , Martin and Bovaird 2005 , Downe and Martin, 2007 , Morphet, 2007 , Laffin 2008 Although local government modernisation has generally been portrayed, in academia, as an exercise in introducing new public management theory, focussing primarily upon performance management regimes, it was much more complex and wide ranging than this in both theory and in practice. Whetnall and his team knew that, if it were to be successful, it had to be based on multiple and mutually reinforcing reforms across policy making, scrutiny and delivery of local government services. At the same time as the main programmes and projects identified in table 2, above, were being initiated, developed and promoted a rich ecology of supporting organisations and projects were being established.
These were later to become known as the improvement infrastructure. Although these new organisations and initiatives were generated around the local Government 'Modernisation Agenda' it was, of course, intended that all of these initiatives would be applied in the Fire Service. However, in the early days of 1999-2002, the focus was on neighbourhood renewal, Best Value, changes to political structures, the development of delivery partnerships and the performance of the major local government services principally education, social services benefits administration and waste services. In short, fire services were not a priority and until Bain revealed the scale of improvement needed. They were keen to keep a low profile and were much more exercised by industrial relations, terms and conditions of services and workforce development. However, as mentioned earlier, the 'distraction' of the Bain review, the subsequent long running national dispute, together with the strength of the services' organisational culture, and the partial and weak application of the first performance management regime for fire, meant that the impact of the modernisation agenda was much less influential than in the rest of local government. The results were not published until after the election in 2005. As with the local authority assessments before them, the services were allocated a single overarching label and five categories of performance were used (Poor, Weak, Fair Good or Excellent). The Audit Commission, who carried out the inspections, also provided a 'direction of travel' judgement, to indicate whether they were improving and the extent of their improvement. The direction of travel included 4 categories; inadequate, adequate, performing well, and performing strongly. This latter making sense only when you remember that the statutory requirement for services to operate was on the basis of facilitating continuous improvement.
The first results are summarised in Outside of the service, it was not generally appreciated that the first fire assessments and the was not the nadir in relationships between the government and the fire community then it was pretty close" (Murphy and Greenhalgh 2014a, p.14) .
The white paper that followed the Bain Review Our Fire and Rescue Services (ODPM 2003) was as unequivocal as the report that preceded it. The government promised "a radical overhaul of fire institutions to achieve strategic direction, service improvement and the provision of professional advice"
and that it would take powers to determine the number and composition of new negotiating bodies for terms and conditions within the service (ODPM, 2003, p 9) .
It had specific chapters differentiating national, regional and local responsibilities, institutional reform and the framework for improving performance (chapters 4-6) and differentiated governance from management when identifying appropriate roles for Fire Authorities and for Fire Services (Chapter 7).
The Act also changed their name to Fire and Rescue Services.
In our view this was delivered to a: (Murphy and Greenhalgh, 2014a, p. 15) .
The new Integrated Personal Development System (IPDS) clarified the different roles of whole-time and retained firefighters and permitted direct recruitment into all levels of the service. As Andrews (2010) has noted this linked career progression to ability rather than rank and hierarchical position for the first time.
The Integrated Risk Management Planning (IRMP) process, which is still in operation, required fire authorities rather than the Secretary of State to determine resources levels, both human and capital, in relation to the pattern of risk to the public and the configuration of services (Fitzgerald, 2005) As we state in the article quoted above, the 2004 Act was however the first step in the rebuilding of a mutually respectful working relationship with the New Labour government and a rebuilding of the services historically high levels of trust with the public. Although it was slow and cautious in its implementation, the Fire and Rescue Services Act fundamentally changed the approach to the assessment of risk and subsequent deployment of the service in response to the changing pattern of risks in the community (Murphy et al 2011 , Murphy and Greenhalgh 2014a 2014b (Murphy and Greenhalgh, 2014b, p.37 move from an overriding emphasis on response to a balance with more emphasis on prevention and forward planning, from tackling incidents to creating resilience, from focussing on a risk to property, to the risk to people.
The designated responsible authorities and agencies, became jointly and severally responsible for preparing and responding to major incidents and emergencies, and for the recovery of the local communities affected. The previous emergency planning arrangements at national and local authority levels, were replaced by more comprehensive 'resilience' arrangements at local regional and national levels. These where to be based on new risk registers and inter-agency planning and response arrangements co-ordinated by national, regional and local resilience boards.
The first decade of the 21 st century saw a series of major hazards, emergencies and domestic disasters, that unlike the 80's and 90s, saw the emergency services at their operational best. The response to these emergencies was to test the new roles, responsibilities and institutions established by the Civil Contingencies Act. They were also going to help restore the services reputation with the government and more importantly with the general public. Cabinet Office Briefing Room A (COBRA) was about to enter the national lexicon.
The first National Framework 2004-05
In  the shift in emphasis to the prevention of fires was already having significant effects,  the National framework was a shared strategy that followed a consultation exercise, the response to which had been overwhelmingly positive,
 that the framework, albeit a one-year document, was part of a long-term reform and improvement agenda and  that the government was committed to achieving long-term reductions in fire deaths and deliberate fires, including real improvement in the most disadvantaged areas, via a new public service agreement.
The framework stresses that this was not a national blueprint. It was to give fire and rescue authorities the flexibility to meet the specific needs of their local communities and, 'a firm foundation on which to build local solutions' (Audit Commission 2005, p.4)
The national framework did not cover Scotland and Northern Ireland as responsibility for fire and rescue services had already been fully devolved. It also anticipated that a forthcoming Fire and Rescue Services
Bill would devolve responsibility in Wales to the National Assembly for Wales.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to show how the fire service changed significantly in terms of its responsibilities (2016, p.155) 
